

## Chapter One

### The Twilight Struggle

#### *Origins of Cold War Political Action, 1945-1950 (U)*

With the breakdown of the wartime Grand Alliance and the resumption of overt ideological hostility between East and West, Moscow in the late 1940s accelerated Communist Party efforts to make Western public opinion take a more favorable view of Soviet foreign policy objectives. A favored approach was for Party members in the West to join or create organizations that were ostensibly non-Communist—and thus attractive to liberals and socialists—but still responsive to direction from Moscow. In the 1920s, a German Communist leader named Willi Münzenberg, building on Leninist techniques of political struggle, had pioneered techniques for directing and exploiting progressive Western sympathy for the cause of revolutionary socialism in the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> In the 1930s the Communist International (better known as the Comintern) adopted the methods developed by Münzenberg in directing the actions of Communists who had newly joined an array of anti-Fascist organizations. Several front groups (including the League of American Writers, the American Artists Congress, and the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom), even operated in the United States. Stalin had disbanded the Comintern in 1943, as a gesture of wartime solidarity with its Western allies. Soon after V-E Day, however, the Soviets began rebuilding their old front groups and founding new ones (such as the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Peace Council). Communists and

<sup>1</sup>Münzenberg, a co-founder of the German Communist Party and member of the Weimar Reichstag, created his Comintern-staffed "Trust" to garner famine relief for the Soviet Union. He later oversaw its expansion in filmmaking and publishing, and in its cooperation with Soviet foreign intelligence organizations. Münzenberg called his front groups "innocents' clubs"; Stephen Koch, *Double Lives: Spies and Writers in the Secret Soviet War of Ideas Against the West* (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 12-28. (U)

their sympathizers also penetrated existing nonpartisan organizations, soon co-opting or at least disrupting several American labor unions and voluntary groups.<sup>2</sup> (U)

The United States at this point had little capability or inclination to respond in kind. During the war Washington had accumulated an energetic if uncoordinated congeries of "psychological warfare" activities, based mainly in the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Demobilization soon claimed both agencies; their employees were released and their files dispersed around Washington. By early 1946, only the Department of State's tame Voice of America and an interagency discussion group—the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee—remained of the US Government's briefly far-ranging foreign and domestic propaganda, "informational," and covert action capabilities.<sup>3</sup> (U)

The Truman administration's announcement in 1947 of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe spurred Moscow to redouble its efforts to influence public opinion in Western Europe. In September 1947, Stalin's lieutenants founded the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), which in turn ordered the French and Italian Communist Parties to mobilize the masses against the Marshall Plan.<sup>4</sup> French and Italian Communists responded with tumultuous (but ultimately futile) campaigns of strikes and propaganda. Communists in other parts of Europe caused trouble as well.<sup>5</sup> (U)

Washington's concern over Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe had been one of several factors leading to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. The Communist-run strikes in France and Italy, followed by the Communist *coup d'etat* in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, suggested to Agency officials and the American foreign policy establishment that Stalin might not give the Marshall Plan (which Congress was still debating) time to rebuild the economies of Western Europe. The Soviet Union, while technically not at war with anyone, had launched a campaign of political subversion that truly was a "cold war"—one that confused the already murky issue of "peacetime" versus "wartime" intelligence operations. (U)

<sup>2</sup>For instance, see Michael Straight's description of the Communist attempt to gain control of the American Veterans Committee, *After Long Silence* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), pp. 233-240. (U)

<sup>3</sup>Edward P. Lilly, "The Psychological Strategy Board and its Predecessors: Foreign Policy Coordination, 1938-1953," in Gaetano L. Vincitorio, editor, *Studies in Modern History* (New York: St. John's University Press, 1968), pp. 354-355. See also Edward P. Barrett, *Truth is Our Weapon* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953), pp. 52-53. (U)

<sup>4</sup>Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974), pp. 448-449, 460-461. (U)

<sup>5</sup>Franz Borkenau, *European Communism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 519-531. (U)



*Josef Stalin. (U)*

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Truman administration officials had to respond to the ambiguous situation with a creative ambiguity of their own. In November 1947, the new National Security Council (NSC) briefly considered assigning peacetime psychological warfare to the Department of State. Secretary of State George Marshall soon dissuaded the NSC from this step, complaining

that covert missions might embarrass his Department and harm American diplomacy. State and the military, however, still wanted a degree of control over psychological operations and decided that the fledgling CIA ought to get this capability: the Agency not only had a worldwide net of operatives, but it also controlled unvouchered funds, which could obviate the need to approach Congress for new appropriations.<sup>6</sup> In December 1947, the National Security Council—despite the misgivings of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Roscoe Hillenkoetter—issued NSC 4-A. Pointing to the “vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups,” this directive determined that CIA was the logical agency to conduct

covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.<sup>7</sup> (U)

NSC 4-A made the DCI responsible for psychological operations, but left him little guidance or means to do so. The Morale Operations Branch of OSS had died with that Office's dissolution in 1945. OWI had perished around the same time, and its overseas informational arm (including the Voice of America) languished in the Department of State's new International Information and Education Division. Congress complicated the situation still further in early 1948, directing the new Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA; which would manage the Marshall Plan) to ensure that America got a proper share of the credit for rebuilding Europe. The Congressmen also passed the Smith-Mundt Act, thereby giving a statutory basis to State's foreign information activities and making the Secretary of State the chief architect of national information policy. Nevertheless, a NSC study complained a few years later that:

We had the tools and blueprint but there was no foreman to tell the agency mechanics what their share was and how it fitted into and contributed to the national plan . . . . Neither State

<sup>6</sup>Arthur B. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), pp. 253-262. Anne Karalekas, “History of the Central Intelligence Agency,” in William M. Leary, ed., *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 40-41. (U)

<sup>7</sup>National Security Council, NSC 4-A, 17 December 1947, reprinted in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 643-644. (U)

nor Defense liked the other to dictate its area of psychological operations. Other than NSC, which had its own problems, there was no body of sufficient stature to direct the existing machinery into an effective coordinated operation.<sup>9</sup> (U)

The DCI in turn assigned the covert action mission to the CIA's Office of Special Operations (OSO). At roughly the same time, the Agency's Office of Reports and Estimates organized its own "International Organizations Group" to analyze Soviet psychological warfare efforts. Other Western governments and intelligence services were taking similar steps at roughly the same time. Britain's Labour government, for instance, in early 1948 created the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD), which was paid out of Secret Intelligence Service funds to spread anti-Soviet ideas and publications. IRD would soon assist "subversive operations" as well.<sup>9</sup> (U)

The NSC responded to the Czech and Berlin crises of early 1948 by expanding the covert action mandate. DCI Hillenkoetter's cautious (though not unsuccessful) use of covert action had satisfied neither State nor Defense officials. Policy Planning Staff chief George Kennan argued that the US Government needed a capability to conduct "political warfare" (Kennan may well have been the anonymous author of a memo calling for covert operations amounting to the "logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine [that war is simply politics by other means] in time of peace"). Believing this role was too important to be left to the CIA, Kennan led the Department of State's bid to win substantial control over covert psychological operations, which would be run by a small staff nominally subordinate to the NSC. The military backed State's efforts, advocating an independent—or at least more powerful—office for psychological warfare.<sup>10</sup> (U)

<sup>9</sup> Edward P. Lilly, National Security Council, "Psychological Operations, 1945-1951," 4 February 1952, Harry S. Truman Library, Psychological Strategy Board files, box 15. Sarah-Jane Corke, "Bridging the Gap: Containment, Covert Action and the Search for the Missing Link in American Cold War Policy, 1948-1953," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 20 (December 1997). (U)

<sup>10</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "IRD: Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department, 1946-48," History Notes, August 1995, pp. 5-7. W. Scott Lucas and C. J. Morris, "A very British Crusade: the Information Research Department and the Beginning of the Cold War," in Richard J. Aldrich, editor, *British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 95-105. (U)

<sup>11</sup> Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, pp. 263-268. (U)

DCI Hillenkoetter saw what was coming and tried to resist it, complaining that CIA would lose control over psychological warfare.<sup>11</sup> His complaints tempered but did not stave off the NSC's decision to intervene in a new directive, NSC 10/2, issued in June 1948 as the Soviets tightened their blockade on West Berlin. NSC 10/2 ostensibly expanded CIA's writ while actually infringing upon the Agency's freedom of action. It directed CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, including

propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.

NSC 10/2 also shifted covert action to a new CIA office—soon styled the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)—that would be administratively quartered in CIA but supervised by the Department of State and the military. In wartime, the entire apparatus was supposed to shift to the Joint Chiefs' control and conduct unconventional operations against the enemy.<sup>12</sup> OPC officially came into being in September 1948 under the directorship of Frank G. Wisner, an OSS veteran who had been serving as deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for the Occupied Areas.<sup>13</sup> (U)


As CIA's Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Wisner's mission was broad but vague.<sup>14</sup> NSC 10/2's phrase "covert operations" covered a wide range of activities. The mandate's ambiguity reflected its novelty; few American officials had experience with such methods and had no body of doctrine governing their use in peacetime. Even so, OPC threw itself into a wide variety of operations, including specific responses to NSC 10/2's call to support "indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world." (U)

<sup>11</sup>Hillenkoetter to Sidney Souers, National Security Council, "Psychological Operations," 11 May 1948, reprinted in Department of State, *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, pp. 676-677. Hillenkoetter to James S. Lay, National Security Council, 9 June 1948, reprinted in *Ibid.*, pp. 703-704. (U)

<sup>12</sup>National Security Council, NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948, reprinted in *Ibid.*, pp. 713-714. (U)

<sup>13</sup>Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, pp. 262-273. Karalekas, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," pp. 41-42. (U)

<sup>14</sup>The title "Assistant Director" is equivalent to the modern CIA position of "Deputy Director," denoting a rank inferior only to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The second-in-command at OPC held the title "Deputy Assistant Director of Policy Coordination." (U)



*George Kennan urged OPC to undertake several projects with American organizations. (R)*

*Wide World ©*

OPC took formal policy guidance from the NSC but received many of its early instructions in personal contacts with George Kennan. Wisner had been at his desk only days when Kennan steered him toward an operation that would serve as a prototype for later political action projects. Kennan urged Wisner to find ways to help non-Communist labor unions in Western Europe. Fearing that the Marshall Plan would not succeed if Communist-dominated unions were able to block supplies and services crucial to the rebuilding of the Continent,

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These early contacts also helped set the precedent for OPC taking its policy guidance more-or-less informally and personally, instead of through the interagency channels that the State-Army-Navy Coordinating Committee (SANACC) and the NSC staff were then laboring to create.<sup>18</sup> (S)

At the same time, the Office undertook a massive "gray" propaganda effort using refugees and émigrés from Eastern Europe.<sup>19</sup> As streams of refugees fled westward from Stalin's reach, George Kennan had seen an opportunity. State's Voice of America had begun broadcasting to Russia in February 1947, and that same year Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton had proposed the creation of a quasi-public foundation to run America's international broadcasting.<sup>20</sup> Kennan added his own twist to these ideas. He believed the US Government needed an instrument with which to deal with the émigrés and coordinate their activities against the Soviet Union, and he passed this task to OPC. The Office brought Kennan's idea to life in 1949 by creating the

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<sup>18</sup> Lilly, "The Psychological Strategy Board," pp. 358-359. (U)

<sup>19</sup>In the evolving parlance of psychological warfare, gray propaganda (as opposed to black and white propaganda) connoted statements or material by ostensibly independent third parties that generally supported US policies. "White" propaganda was officially and obviously produced by the US Government. "Black" propaganda was designed to look as though it emanated from an enemy source. An example of black propaganda, in an early 1950's context, would be a fake Communist Chinese editorial denouncing Stalin. (U)

<sup>20</sup>Barrett, *Truth is Our Weapon*, p. 67. (U)



*Frank G. Wisner, the activist first Assistant Director for Policy Coordination. (U)*

National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE), which the following year gave birth to Radio Free Europe. Based in New York City, NCFE was a private organization ostensibly run by concerned American and émigré figures but actually controlled by OPC.<sup>21</sup> (U)

<sup>21</sup>NCFE's founding is chronicled in some detail by Sig Mickelson, *America's Other Voice: the Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1983), pp 14-22. (U)

OPC's experience with NCFE taught OPC how to manage certain problems inherent in such operations. "The front organization concept is an old one," Wisner's deputy Merritt Ruddock reported in early 1949:

The [US] Government has shied away from it in the past because of (a) fears that Government support and participation could not long be concealed; (b) the reluctance of prominent individuals to associate themselves with a facade or pure front; and (c) fears that the people who would consent to joining a front might be hard to handle and/or try to run with the ball.

Ruddock believed that, in creating NCFE, OPC had devised a new technique intended to minimize these problems. US Government support for the National Committee hid behind a series of organizational and financial structures that impeded outside scrutiny, and helped both NCFE and the government to deny rumors of clandestine dealings. In addition, those who publicly ran NCFE were carefully chosen private figures (such as New York attorney Allen Dulles and Ambassador Joseph C. Grew) who sympathized with American foreign policy objectives. The broad convergence of interests between Washington and NCFE obviated any need for the CIA to exercise direct control over NCFE's operations.<sup>22</sup>

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Theory soon emulated the change in practice. James Burnham, a New York University professor of philosophy, author of a provocative 1940 study *The Managerial Revolution*, and a consultant for OPC, provided a philosophical underpinning for the methods and motives of these and similar operations in his new book, *The Coming Defeat of Communism*. Applauding America's revived will to resist the Communist advance, Burnham offered proposals for combating Communism abroad. He had already detected signs of restiveness and "vulnerability" in the new Soviet empire; the West, he hoped, might be able to win its grim struggle without total war. ~~(S)~~

Burnham's *The Coming Defeat of Communism* proposed that the United States Government maintain an "unorthodox branch" (looking much like OPC), and dropped enthusiastic hints about the potency of "untraditional methods" of "political-subversive warfare." In particular, this new organization could advise and fund the efforts of private American groups willing to help in the struggle against Communism. American students, businessmen, or trade union officials, for example, might do

<sup>22</sup>Merritt K. Ruddock, Deputy Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, to Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, 8 March 1949, Information Management Staff Job 78-04938R, box 1, folder 1. (S)

better than US Government officials at handling their foreign counterparts, if helped by the proper "guiding and co-ordinating agency."<sup>23</sup> Burnham's relationship with OPC makes it difficult to know how much of *The Coming Defeat of Communism* echoed (or influenced) ideas already circulating in the Office.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, Frank Wisner liked the book well enough to give copies to DCI Hillenkoetter to pass it out to Congressmen interested in OPC.<sup>25</sup> (c)

#### The Peace Offensive (U)

Officials in OPC and the Department of State soon concluded that other sectors of Western society—youth, students, intellectuals, veterans, and others—were also at risk of Communist subversion. Lacking positive guidance from the NSC and its welter of interagency staff committees charged with coordinating national psychological warfare strategy, OPC apparently on its own initiative applied to this problem some of the same techniques and agents it was learning to use with foreign labor unions and European émigrés. (U)

Stalin's recourse to political subversion as his primary weapon against the Marshall Plan in Western Europe placed new emphasis on the international front groups the Soviets had been building since 1945. In late 1948, Moscow began stepping up its efforts to capitalize on the popular dread of another terrible war. German diplomat Gustav Hilger, who had been one of Hitler's foremost Soviet experts, explained to an internal CIA audience that Moscow sought to convince people "that the maintenance of world peace depends solely on the further attitude of the Western Powers because the Soviet Union had sufficiently proved that it wants peace."<sup>26</sup> Beginning in Wroclaw, Poland, in September 1948, Soviet agents built their campaign to influence Western opinion around a series of international "cultural" conferences designed to provide stages for Communist-inspired pronouncements calling for world peace and condemning the Truman administration's increasingly confrontational

<sup>23</sup>James Burnham, *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), pp. 252-253. See also George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945* (New York: Basic Books, 1979 ed.), pp. 94-95. (U)

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<sup>26</sup>Gustav Hilger, "Observations on the Communist 'Peace Offensive,'" 21 January 1949, reprinted in Warner, ed., *The CIA Under Harry Truman* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), p. 244. (U)

policies. Conferences scheduled for Mexico City, New York, and Paris aimed at convincing Western artists, writers, and scholars that Moscow was the last hope for world peace.<sup>27</sup> (U)

The "peace offensive" came to the United States in March 1949 with the opening of the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace at New York City's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.<sup>28</sup> Conference organizers copied the format of the Comintern-inspired congresses of writers and artists of the 1930s, attracting a panoply of American writers and artists, including Lillian Hellman, Aaron Copland, and Arthur Miller. The delegates joined with European and Soviet delegates to repudiate "U.S. war-mongering." Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich, for example, told the delegates that "a small clique of hatemongers" was preparing a global conflagration, and he urged progressive artists to struggle against the new "Fascists" who were seeking world domination. Shostakovich, who had recently penned an ode to Stalin's forestry program, also described for his 800 listeners "the unheard-of scope and level of development reached by musical culture in the USSR." American panelists echoed the Russian composer's fear of a new global conflict. Playwright Clifford Odets, for example, denounced the "enemies of Man" and claimed that fraudulent reports of Soviet aggression had whipped the United States into "a state of holy terror." Composer Aaron Copland declared "the present policies of the American Government will lead inevitably into a third world war."<sup>29</sup> (U)

The Cominform could hardly have picked a riskier place than New York City to stage a Stalinist peace conference. The City's ethnic communities brimmed with refugees from Communism, and its campuses and numerous cultural and political journals employed hundreds of politically left-leaning men and women who had fought in the bitter ideological struggles over Stalinism that divided American labor unions, college faculties, and cultural organizations before World War II. A handful of liberal and socialist New York writers, led by philosophy professor Sidney Hook, had seen an opportunity to steal a little of the publicity expected for the upcoming conference. Hook, a fierce ex-radical, was

<sup>27</sup>International Organizations Group (Office of Reports and Estimates), "Weekly Summary No. 31," 14 December 1948, Office of Transnational Issues Job 78-01617A, box 49. (U)

<sup>28</sup>The conference's American sponsor was the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, in coordination with the Paris-based World Congress of Intellectuals, an organization linked to the Cominform. International Organizations Group, "Weekly Summary No. 8," 22 February 1949, Office of Transnational Issues Job 78-01617A, box 49 (declassified), (U)

<sup>29</sup>"Shostakovich Bids All Artists Lead War on New 'Fascists,'" *New York Times*, 28 March 1949, p. 1. Richard H. Parke, "Our Way Defended to 2,000 Opening 'Culture' Meeting," *New York Times*, 26 March 1949, p. 1. Paul Johnson, *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties* (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), p. 453. (U)

teaching philosophy at New York University and writing for a socialist magazine, *The New Leader*. Ten years earlier, he and his mentor John Dewey had founded a controversial group called the Committee for Cultural Freedom, which attacked both Communism and Nazism.<sup>30</sup> Hook's new group called itself the "Americans for Intellectual Freedom" and boasted some big names of its own, such as critics Dwight MacDonald and Mary McCarthy, composer Nicolas Nabokov, and commentator Max Eastman.<sup>31</sup> (U)

Arnold Beichman, a labor reporter friendly with anti-Communist union leaders, remembered the excitement of tweaking the Soviet delegates and their fellow conferees. "We didn't have any staff, we didn't have any salaries to pay anything. But inside of about one day the place was just busting with people volunteering." One of Beichman's union friends persuaded the sold-out Waldorf to base Hook and his group in a three-room suite ("I told them if you don't get that suite we'll close the hotel down," he informed Beichman), and another labor connection installed ten phone lines on a Sunday morning.<sup>32</sup> (U)

Funds for the counterattack came from a variety of sources, including David Dubinsky (president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union) and Hook's own modest savings.<sup>33</sup> 25X1

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Hook and his friends stole the show. They interrogated the Soviet delegates at the conference's panel discussions and staged an evening rally of their own in Bryant Park.<sup>34</sup> News stories on the peace conference

<sup>30</sup>Sidney Hook, *Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 20th Century* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1987), p. 261. (U)

<sup>31</sup>Nabokov was a cousin of novelist Vladimir Nabokov and a contact of columnist Joseph Alsop, whose call to DCI Hillenkoetter got Nabokov a meeting with the Director in 1948. There is no record of what they discussed. See the Director's telephone and appointments log for 27 and 29 January 1948, Executive Registry Job 80R01731R, box 26, folder 873. (U)

<sup>32</sup>Arnold Beichman, interview by Michael Warner, tape recording, McLean, VA, 17 March 1994 (hereinafter cited as Beichman interview) (Administrative Internal Use Only). Recordings, transcripts and notes for the interviews conducted for this study are on file in the CIA History Staff, CIA. (U)

<sup>33</sup>Hook, *Out of Step*, p. 388. (U)

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<sup>34</sup>Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York, Free Press, 1989), pp. 5-6. (U)

reported the activities of the Americans for Intellectual Freedom in detail. "The only paper that was against us in this reporting was the *New York Times*," recalled Beichman. "It turned out years later that [the *Times*' reporter] was a member of the Party."<sup>16</sup> (U)

As soon as the Waldorf Congress closed, OPC started preparing for future peace conferences. The Office still had only a handful of staffers, but it tried to make up in energy what it lacked in structure and experience. Carmel Offie asked OPC's Department of State supervisor, Robert Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff, whether State intended to mount a similar "riposte" to a coming Communist-run peace conference in Paris.<sup>17</sup> Offie had recently served in Frankfurt and was well acquainted with Irving Brown and his wide net of contacts in Western Europe; he had both the experience and influence to direct OPC's efforts in this new field.<sup>18</sup> (S)

Over the next few weeks, OPC communicated a makeshift covert action plan for the Paris conference through at least three separate channels. The AFL's Irving Brown and Raymond Murphy of State's Bureau of European Affairs wrote to the Paris Embassy's First Secretary, Norris Chipman, while Wisner himself cabled Averell Harriman seeking 5 million francs (roughly \$16,000) from the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to fund a counterdemonstration.<sup>19</sup> Murphy graphically explained the need for a response to the Communist peace conference:

Now the theme is that the United States and the western democracies are the war-mongers and Fascists and the Kremlin and its stooges the peace-loving democracies. And there is a better than even chance that by constant repetition the Com-mies can persuade innocents to follow this line. Perhaps not immediately but in the course of the next few years because there is a tremendous residue of pacificism [*sic*], isolationism and big business [*sic*] to be exploited. For example, a recession in the United States might cause people to lose interest

<sup>16</sup> Beichman interview, 17 March 1994. (U)

<sup>17</sup> Carmel Offie, Special Assistant, Office of Policy Coordination, to Robert P. Joyce, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, "Peace Conference in Paris," 28 March 1949, European Division

25X1 CIA analysis of the upcoming conference is contained in International Organizations Group, "Weekly Summary No. 15," 12 April 1949, Office of Transnational Issues Job 78-01617A, box 49 (declassified).<sup>18</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Horsh, *The Old Boys*, pp. 255, 259. Warner, *The CIA Under Harry Truman*, p. xxxviii. (U)

<sup>20</sup> Irving Brown to Norris Chipman, First Secretary, US Embassy Paris, 4 April 1949. 25X1

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23X1 this request was also signed by DCI Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter. The 5 million francs would come from Marshall Plan "counterpart funds." See also Morgan, *A Covert Life*, p. 149. (U)

in bolstering Europe . . . I think you will agree that this phony peace movement actually embraces far more than intellectuals and that any counter-congress should emphasize also that the threat to world peace comes from the Kremlin and its allies.<sup>40</sup> (U)

Working with Irving Brown, Chipman contacted French socialist David Rousset and his allies at the breakaway leftist newspaper *Franc Tireur*, which in turn organized an "International Day of Resistance to Dictatorship and War," inviting Hook and other prominent anti-Communists.<sup>41</sup> OPC also covertly paid the travel costs of the German, Italian, and American delegations. The latter comprised Sidney Hook and novelist James T. Farrell; neither knew of OPC's involvement.<sup>42</sup> (U)

The Paris counterconference disappointed its American observers. Although it attracted a number of prominent anti-Stalinists and provoked angry blasts from French Communists, its tone was too radical and neutralist for Hook and Farrell, who felt obliged to defend US foreign policy against criticism by philosopher Jean Paul Sartre and other participants.<sup>43</sup> OPC and State agreed with Hook's assessment.<sup>44</sup> Carmel Offie did not believe that OPC had to rely on Rousset and his *Franc Tireur* crowd to reach French and European anti-Stalinists. Frank Wisner added a pointed postscript:

We are concerned lest this type of "leadership" for a continuing organization would result in the degeneration of the entire idea (of having a little "DEMINFORM") into a nuts folly of miscellaneous goats and monkeys whose antics would completely discredit the work and statements of the serious and responsible liberals. We would have serious misgivings about supporting such a show [emphasis added].<sup>45</sup> (U)

<sup>40</sup>Raymond E. Murphy, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, to Norris Chipman

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<sup>41</sup>Carmel Offie to Norris Chipman, 4 May 1949, 25X1

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<sup>43</sup>"Paris Rally Hails Freedom in Peace," *New York Times*, 1 May 1949, n. 12; Hook, *Out of Step*, pp. 400-401. 25X1

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*Irving Brown made his extensive European contacts available to OPC. (c)*

OPC now shelved Irving Brown's idea of holding a "World Conference for Intellectual Freedom and Peace" in France that summer.\* Nevertheless, the idea took on a life of its own when Sidney Hook chatted in

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Paris with his friend Melvin J. Lasky about the prospects for a permanent committee of anti-Communist intellectuals from Europe and America. Observers on both sides of the Atlantic concluded that the Continent needed a real conference of anti-Communists.<sup>47</sup> Sidney Hook expressed the thought in typically apocalyptic terms:

Give me a hundred million dollars and a thousand dedicated people, and I will guarantee to generate such a wave of democratic unrest among the masses—yes, even among the soldiers—of Stalin's own empire, that all his problems for a long period of time to come will be internal. I can find the people.<sup>48</sup> (U)

In August 1949 an important meeting took place in Frankfurt. Melvin Lasky, together with a pair of German ex-Communist refugees from Nazism, Franz Borkenau and Ruth Fischer, hatched a plan for an international conference of the non-Communist Left in Berlin the following year.<sup>49</sup> Each of the three brought unique experiences and perspectives to their meeting. Lasky, only 29, had been a journalist and US Army historian during the war. He was already prominent in German intellectual circles as an anti-Communist and as the founding editor of *Der Monat*, a literary review sponsored by the American occupation government as a means of bringing Western writers back into the ken of the German public. In 1947, Lasky had taken no small risk by denouncing Stalin's latest purge of the Russian intelligentsia at a Communist-sponsored writers' conference in East Berlin. He had attended the Paris peace conference in April 1949, as had Borkenau, who had been a disappointed member of the German delegation.<sup>50</sup> The third person present at that Frankfurt meeting, Ruth Fischer (given name Elfriede Eisler), knew perhaps as much as anyone in the West about Communist political action operations. She had recently published *Stalin and German Communism*, a study drawn from her experience as a former leader of the German Communist Party

<sup>47</sup>Sidney Hook, *Out of Step*, p. 432. (U)

<sup>48</sup>Sidney Hook cited in Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, p. 15. (U)

<sup>49</sup>Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, p. 15. (U)

<sup>50</sup>Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, p. 4

Borkenau, *European Communism*, p. 106. (S)

and a member of the Weimar Republic's Reichstag. *Stalin and German Communism* had included an analysis of Willi Münzenberg's creation and use of front groups in the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>51</sup> (U)

Fischer drafted a proposal for a Berlin conference, explaining the idea as a way of using the Cominform's methods against it to sow doubt and dissension in the European Communist parties, particularly in France and Germany.<sup>52</sup> She also gave the proposal to a diplomat friend in Paris, Norris Chipman. Fischer's cover letter added rhetorical flourish:

I think we talked about this plan already during my last stay in Paris, but I have now a much more concrete approach to it. I mean, of course, the idea of organising a big Anti-Waldorf-Astoria Congress in Berlin itself. It should be a gathering of all ex-Communists, plus a good representative group of anti-Stalinist American, English and European intellectuals, declaring its sympathy for Tito and Yugoslavia and the silent opposition in Russia and the satellite states, and giving the Politburo hell right at the gate of their own hell.

All my friends agree that it would be of enormous effect, and radiate to Moscow, if properly organised. It would create great possibilities for better co-ordination afterwards, and would also lift the spirits of Berlin anti-Stalinists, which are somewhat fallen at present.

Fischer hoped to talk to "a few friends in Washington" about the idea upon her return to the States.<sup>53</sup> (U)

Officials in Washington began to take notice, although Ruth Fischer's association with the scheme tainted it in some eyes. Carmel Offie had been alerted by Jay Lovestone in early August that Fischer would soon seek official American support for some venture; Lovestone warned Offie not to rely on Fischer "for any serious business."<sup>54</sup> Chipman

<sup>51</sup>Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origins of the State Party* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1948), pp. 610-614. Fischer's estranged brother, Gerhart Eisler, had been a Comintern agent in New York and was dubbed "the Number One Communist in the US" shortly before he was convicted (in 1947) of falsifying an exit visa. Freed on bail, he slipped his FBI tail and boarded a Polish ship; afterward he worked for many years as a propagandist in East Germany. Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman, *The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story* (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 44, 48-49, 64. (U)

<sup>52</sup>Ruth Fischer to Norris Chipman, 24 August 1949, in Political and Psychological Staff Job 78-01614R, box 1, folder 5, (Unclassified). (C)

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pouched the Fischer proposal to Offie in mid-September, and OPC officers debriefed Fischer herself in Washington a few weeks later. Some of the officers who heard her were unimpressed with the idea, but Offie seems to have thought the proposal worth a closer look.<sup>55</sup> (S)

In any event, OPC apparently did not know how to get the Fischer plan off the ground. The proposal sat around until January 1950, when Michael Josselson stepped forward to promote it. Josselson had witnessed the shaky beginnings of the anti-Communist counteroffensive at the Waldorf-Astoria and Paris that spring, while on leave from his duties as a cultural officer for the American occupation government in Germany. He told his composer friend Nicholas Nabokov that Berlin needed something similar.<sup>56</sup> In September 1949 Josselson the Office of Policy Coordination. Soon he talked with Lasky about the proposed conference.<sup>57</sup> (S)

Michael Josselson was perhaps the perfect man for the job of implementing the Berlin conference idea for OPC. Born in Estonia in 1908, the son of a Jewish timber merchant, he moved with his family to Berlin during the Russian Revolution. As a young man Josselson studied at the Universities of Berlin and Freiburg, but he took a job as a buyer for the American Gimbels-Saks retail chain before earning a degree. Gimbels eventually made him its chief European buyer and transferred him to Paris, and then on to New York before the war. Josselson became an American citizen in 1942. Drafted the next year, he made sergeant and served as an interrogator in the US Army's Psychological Warfare Division. Like Melvin Lasky, Josselson stayed on in Berlin after demobilization to work with the American occupation authorities. Berlin was an ideal post for Josselson, who spoke excellent English, French, German, and Russian.<sup>58</sup> (U)

The drama and intrigue of postwar Berlin awakened something in Josselson and gave him scope to exercise his considerable talents as an operator, administrator, and innovator. His enthusiasm was boundless, his energy immense. He was soon working with the de-Nazification effort, helping to "rehabilitate" prominent Germans such as conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler and theater director Jürgen Fehling. In addition,


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<sup>55</sup>Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 5-6, 25X1

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<sup>56</sup>Josselson's personal history is attested in Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 40-43, 25X1

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*Michael Josselson with German conductor Jürgen Fehling. (U)*

having received an order in late September 1946 to create a new Berlin newspaper in time to influence the city's first postwar elections, scheduled for 20 October, Josselson accomplished the impossible with time to spare. In a city where 13 dailies already competed for readers (and for the limited supply of politically acceptable journalistic talent), Josselson took less than two weeks to hire the paper's staff and set its format and political line. The newspaper hit the streets—with a circulation of 100,000—in time to influence Berlin's first free elections in 14 years.<sup>28</sup> In addition, Josselson, in his capacity of Chief of Intelligence for the military government's Information Control Branch, soon became a valued

<sup>28</sup>Frank L. Howley, Office of Military Government (Berlin), to Lucius D. Clay, Commanding General, Office of Military Government for Germany. "Recommendation for Award." 8 January 1947, in 25X1